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This paper investigates the impact of prolonged social distancing on generosity by an-
alyzing the responses of 1255 US citizens to dictator games spread out over eight weeks
of the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite the isolation and the negative
effects on employment and household finances, individuals became more generous over
this time period. There is significant heterogeneity in the effect of additional regressors,
such as perceived contagion risk, on the likelihood and amount donated to strangers,
family members, or the government. At the same time, significant effects of the po-
sition of games with respect to the others highlight the significant role of framing on
generous behaviours.
Keywords: Generosity, Dictator Game, Social Preferences, Framing, Altruism, Covid-
19
JEL Codes: C71, D63, D64, D71, D91, I14
∗University College of London, UCL Bartlett School of Environment, Energy and Resources. Central
House, 14 Upper Woburn Place, London WC1H 0NN, UK
1 Introduction
During the Second World-War, dozens of thousands of citizens protected the Jewish from the
Holocaust: the so-called ”Righteous Among the Nations” bravely put their and their fami-
lies’ lives at risk, and thanks to their altruist neighbours, friends as well as perfect strangers
were saved from an atrocious destiny.
In fact, many other circumstances in history have shown how altruism and generosity flourish
during hard times, providing strong evidence of the existence of social preferences. Accord-
ing to de Waal (2008), these mechanisms could date back even 60 million years, and they
are likely to be linked with empathy feelings in seeing others in difficulty. Story et al. (2015)
is also investigating the role of empathy: participants show similar altruistic behaviours in
dividing money and pain (electric shocks) with receivers, even if, in the latter case, a larger
share of individuals allocate more painful stimuli to themselves. Such altruistic behaviours
could also be related to the so-called ”warm-glow” effect (Andreoni, 1989) and its feeling of
reward in helping others, and with sentiments of fairness and justice.
This paper analyses how generosity has changed during the US lock-down, disentangling
altruistic behaviours towards relatives, neighbours, anonymous, and the government (to
support social services). In an online experiment, participants from California, New York,
and Washington states played four dictator games, each for the type of receiver considered.
Results from 8 weeks of lock-down show how generosity towards each category evolved: a
positive effect of self-reported concern for the pandemic on amount and likelihood of dona-
tions, with an increasingly positive effect of time spent in lock-down as well. The findings
of this research are particularly interesting if we consider the simultaneous drop in employ-
ment rate and financial resources recorded in the US, on top of the other well known and
devastating effects of the pandemic.
Positive effects of the pandemic-related regressors on the likelihood and amount of donations
to strangers, family members, or the government are not homogeneous.
Understanding generosity is far from straight forward. As many studies have demonstrated,
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individuals behave very differently depending on context (Laury and Taylor, (2008)), their
gender (Heinz, (2011)), social distance with others (Bohnet and Frey (1999)) or whether
the resources to donate were earned with effort (Cherry (2002)). Leider (2009) focuses on
directed altruism in social networks, demonstrating that the former is stronger than ratio-
nal calculations which take into account reciprocity in future interactions; moreover, in this
paper baseline altruism is disentangled from the one directed to friends, highlighting a sig-
nificant increase in donations in the latter. Our network is made of connections of different
intensity with other individuals, such as strangers, neighbours, and relatives: Guala and Fil-
ippin (2017) focus on group identity, and how this is a driver in shaping individuals’ social
preferences.
Generosity and altruism could significantly differ depending on the relationship we have
with the receiver, and these behaviours could not exhibit similar dynamics when exposed to
exogenous shocks. When facing difficult situations, our generosity could change over time,
and in different ways considering the receiver of our altruistic behaviours: this would allow
for a dynamically variable concept of generosity, in place of a static vision.
COVID-19 pandemic has been a unique event in recent human history, bringing most coun-
tries to adopt lock-down policies and abruptly forcing billions into isolation. The risk of
infecting and getting infected increased social distance and possibly the fear of others, many
lost their lives, relatives, and friends. The pandemic also dramatically affected the economy
of countries, with an unprecedented increase in unemployment rates and shrinking GDP
level. This prolonged isolation, and its direct consequences, could have affected social pref-
erences; a situation like a lock-down could indirectly link money and pain, unifying two
aspects already investigated by Story et al. (2015). While the media have very frequently
reported altruistic behaviours (large donations for hospitals and ventilators, shopping for
neighbours in categories at risk), some other events such as stockpiling of goods or examples
of little care in preserving the health of the community (not complying to lock-down regu-
lation) could anticipate increasing self-oriented preferences.
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Regardless the between-subject nature of this experiment, as in many other papers on gen-
erosity participants were required to perform multiple tasks: in line with the rest of the
literature (Andreoni and Miller (2002), Guala and Filippin (2017)), the different games have
been randomized in order. However, the design of this research is an opportunity to investi-
gate the role of framing on altruistic behaviours. More specifically, perfectly rational answers
on the four games should not depend on their order; otherwise, it would mean that some
decisions could create a reference point for the other ones. The significant role of framing
on attitudes towards monetary allocations is showed in Guala and Filippin (2017).
As second objective, in this paper I am analysing the effect of the different order in which
games are played on donations; moreover, I expect that responding to the dictator game on
a relative as first sets a reference point for all the following tasks, negatively affecting those
donations. This is because, on average, donations towards relatives are much higher than
any other category considered.
As an example, let us imagine that a respondent needs to divide funds with an anonymous
as first game, and the choice would be a number between 0 and 1000 dollars; in theory,
the same range of options would be available in the case the participant played the game
towards a relative as first and to an anonymous receiver as second, however, my prior is that
in the latter case the range would be reduced from zero up to the donation to the relative,
which then becomes a reference point and could negatively impact the donation towards the
anonymous receiver. If this is the case, framing would have another significant effect on the
investigated altruistic behaviours.
To conclude, the analysis considers the role of some variables reviewed in the literature, such
as gender and other demographics, and explores the effect of anxiety on generosity.
The next sections of the paper are organized as follows: Method summarizes the design of
the experiment, sampling methods, participants’ characteristics, procedure, and a descrip-
tion of the main variables of interest. Results are divided into descriptive and inferential
statistics, and the main findings and concluding remarks and possible future developments
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are then presented in the Discussion.
2 Methodology
1355 subjects were recruited on Amazon Mechanical Turk for an online experiment. Each
participant was paid .30 dollars, and recruitment has been run between Monday and Wednes-
day for eight weeks starting on the 30th of March. To best observe how individuals with
similar backgrounds were reacting to COVID-19 pandemic across the weeks, the recruitment
was focused on three states in the United States: New York, Washington, and California.
These three states also had very different pandemic situations in terms of magnitude and
trends.
The original intention was, for the desired power of .80, being able to detect effects between
.30 and .35 SDs, in line with other dictator game experiments (Engel (2011)): Across the
eight weeks, a total of 2000 participants were recruited, which decreased to 1255 after the
cleaning process. The final sample corresponds to 156 observations per week on average, in
line with the initial target.
Table 1 shows the main characteristics of the sample investigated: compared to the pop-
ulation of reference from the three states considered, age categories 25-34 and 35-44 are
over-represented, while lower percentages of individuals above 65 years old participated in
the experiment 1 (as it frequently happens with M Turk data collections (McDuffie, 2019).
In terms of educational attainments, the share of the population without a high-school
diploma is under-represented as more than 70 percent of the sample holds at least a bache-
lor’s degree. To conclude, evaluating differences between the employment status when com-
pleting the test and one month before there is a 4.7 percentage points net shift from working
to unemployment positions, in line with the drastic increase in unemployment recorded dur-
ing COVID-19 pandemic.
Beyond the information related to participants, this research focuses on the three states, Cal-
1The age category “Over 75”, four participants, has been merged with the larger one “65-74” years old.
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ifornia New York and Washington: additional tables and figures in the Appendix describe
the evolution of employment (and related benefits) and the pandemic, between the end of
March and end of May.
As a first task, participants were required to complete four dictator games, administered in
random order; each game had a similar wording: ”Imagine that today you have been given
1000 dollars. How much of this amount are you willing to give to [. . . ]”.
However, the four games differed in the hypothetical receiver: an anonymous person X, the
current government (”to support public services”), one of the relatives, or one neighbor.
These four decisions were all independent, and an integer number between 0 and 1000 could
be typed as an answer.
After the dictator games, participants were required to fill in a questionnaire on socio-
demographics and attitudes and feelings. In particular information on gender, age, current
and previous (one month before) employment status, education, marital status was collected;
in the second part of the questionnaire, respondents were asked about their feelings in the
previous week, towards COVID-19, the current government and daily tasks (related to the
ability to manage workload and home duties).
To conclude, the dataset obtained online was enriched with state-specific information on
COVID-19 (number of total deaths and cases, and their percentage increase from the previ-
ous day 2) and unemployment (unemployment insurance weekly claims and insured unem-
ployment rates 3).
The following results section is based on two dependent variables: the amount donated for
each dictator game, continuous variables with a range of 0 to 1000 (dollars), and the prob-
ability of donating; in this latter case, the dependent variable is a dummy which equals to
one for a positive donation. Furthermore, several regressors will be considered to infer the
2Information was obtained by the official websites of each state:
Washington https://www.coronavirus.wa.gov/ ,
California https://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CID/DCDC/Pages/Immunization/ncov2019.aspx,
New York State https://coronavirus.health.ny.gov/home
3UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR Employment Training Administration
https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/claims.asp
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dynamic effect of the pandemic on generosity: total number and daily percentage changes
in deaths and cases, as well as the week in which the test was completed and the state
of residence. On this note, percentage change variables take into account the time of the
daily announcement for a certain state: this is because doing the experiment before or after
a certain announcement (a positive or negative change of the situation) could impact the
respondents’ answers. The state-specific unemployment rate and amount of individuals re-
ceiving benefits, together with answers on financial security and employment (current and
one month before) will be considered as independent variables; moreover, the information
collected in the questionnaire will be used to investigate the role of the concern towards
coronavirus, trust in the government, moods, and demographics (gender, age, marital sta-
tus, and education).
To conclude the description of the variables, the regressions will take into account when a
certain dictator game was completed compared to the other three, and a dummy variable to
consider the cases in which the game on relatives was played first.
3 Results
Descriptive Statistics
Data collected across the eight weeks show how participants exhibited diverse generosity
behaviours towards each of the receivers: Figure 1 summarizes mean donations in the four
different dictator games.
As expected, given a stronger emotional bond, donations to relatives are strikingly higher
than any other dictator game considered: on average, participants are willing to give them
almost one-third of the total amount received. The other three dictator games exhibit aver-
age donations closer to each other, with anonymous receivers getting the least amount, then
neighbours and financing public services through the government being the second-highest
category. How participants discriminated between receivers is also reflected in the cumu-
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lative donations, showed in Figure 2: while around 10 percent of the sample donated 0 to
relatives, increasing up to 1000 dollars, around half did not share anything with anonymous
and 40 percent towards neighbours and government (which exhibit similar patterns).
Respondents from the three states gave different answers (Figure 3), with New York dona-
tions to anonymous receivers as the lowest average overall, Washington residents particularly
generous towards neighbours (higher average than the ones for the government) and rela-
tives, and California more supportive with anonymous and the government (compared to
the other two states).
Considering demographic information, women appeared to donate less than men on average,
in all dictator games except the one on relatives: Figure 4 shows the discrepancy in donations
by gender, which will be further discussed in the inferential statistics section.
To conclude descriptive statistics, it is crucial to focus on the dynamics of donations across
the eight weeks of investigation: while the time passed, the coronavirus pandemic was be-
coming more burdensome in the US, and citizens were in lock-down for an increasing amount
of time. Figure 5 shows how donations changed over time, providing preliminary insights
into the researcher’s hypotheses.
Overall, all four mean donations increased between the first and the eight weeks, following
similar patterns even if with different gradients: while donations increase has been flatter
for relatives, dollars corresponded to anonymous more than doubled in two months, and
doubled in case of dictator games on neighbours and government.
Inferential Statistics
In this section, results from regressions will be grouped considering the four dictator games,
each in a different subsection: The main tables will contain the independent variables rel-
evant to evaluate my hypotheses, however, a brief final subsection will describe the main
findings on the other regressors.
To analyse results from the different experiments, a robust heteroskedastic OLS regression
is run for measuring the impact of the independent variables on the amount donated. List
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(2007) allows for dictators to take money from receivers, demonstrating that fewer agents
are willing to donate in this case than the standard case: for this reason, I also run Tobit
regressions to consider the possibility of censored negative replies from participants.
Figure 2 also showed that answers from the experiments are in line with findings in the rest of
the literature on dictator games, with a large share of participant giving zero to the receiver:
for this reason, a quantile regression has been performed, and the following tables report
effects of the first (only for relatives, there is no variation in the other games), second and
third quartiles. To conclude, the last row of the results tables shows the average marginal
effects of the independent variables on the probability of donating (logit).
Dictator Game towards Anonymous Receiver
Table 2 summarizes the main findings from the dictator game with an anonymous receiver.
The ordinal variable on being concerned from Covid-19 has no significant effects, as well
as the daily percentage change in deaths. At the same time, there is a significant positive
effect of the weeks following the first one on the amount donated: in both OLS and Tobit
regressions there is a positive trend in the increase in donation, reaching its peak on the last
week (an increase of 105 dollars on average, according to OLS results). None of the variables
related to which measure the ”Covid-19” effect has an impact on the probability of donating
towards anonymous receivers.
Dictator Game towards a Neighbour Receiver
In Table 3, results from regressions show the effects of independent variables on the amount
donated, and the probability of donating, to a neighbor receiver. Considering the statement
”Covid-19 is concerning”, compared to ”Strongly Disagree” the other answers do not bring
significant changes in the amount donated; however, logit regression shows a significant in-
crease in the probability of donating, in all categories.
This effect is particularly strong for those who selected ”Agree” or ”Strongly Agree”, with
a (1%) significant increase in the probability of 48 and 55 percentage points.
At the same time, playing in the weeks after the first one significantly increases the amount
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donated: this is showed by both OLS and Tobit regressions, with all weeks significantly
higher than the first one. The amount donated increases across the period of analysis, even
if not always in a monotonic way: in fact, in both regressions there is a small drop in the
increase in week 7. From the fourth week onwards, the positive effect is also significant
at .5 and .75 quantiles, with the latter showing larger effects. Probability of donating also
increased compared to the first week: from 19 percentage points more in week two, up to 35
in week 8.
Dictator Game towards a Relative Receiver
The main results on donations towards a relative receiver are summarized in Table 4. Also
in this case, self-reporting being concerned of COVID-19 increase the amount donated (both
OLS and Tobit have significant results for ”Agree” and ”Strongly Agree”), and considering
quantile regressions it seems this effect is concentrated in the high end of the distribution of
the donations (.75 quantile is significant for both the options highlighted before).
One finding which is uncommon to the other dictator games is the effect of the percentage
change in deaths on the amount donated: for high amounts (Q.75), a positive change signif-
icantly increases donations by around 3 dollars, on average.
Considering the week after the first one, for small donations, week 3 has a significant positive
effect, while for large donations the last week has it; in this latter case, also the probability
of donating has a 23 percentage points increase.
Dictator Game towards the Government as Receiver
Considering the dictator game towards the government (to support public services), Table 5
shows how being concerned about COVID-19 is scarcely affecting the dependent variables:
selecting ”Strongly Agree” is the only option which (5%) significantly increases the amount
donated (only according to the Tobit regression). It also enhances the likelihood of respond-
ing with a positive donation (43 percentage points increase, 5% significant).
The percentage change in deaths does not bring significant effects, which instead remains for
the weeks following the first one: in this case, for OLS regression, the third, fifth and eight
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have an increase in donations, and Tobit counts the fourth and seventh as well among the
significant ones.
As for quantile regressions, for the second quartile weeks, sixth and eight show a positive
effect in donations, and considering the logit fourth and eight have a significant impact on
rising the likelihood of donating.
Game Ordering
Focusing on the effect of the position in which a dictator game is played compared to the
others, Table 2 considers donations to anonymous: playing the version on relatives first does
not significantly affect quantity nor probability of donating, instead not responding on the
anonymous game first significantly reduces the amount donated to this category of receivers.
In particular, playing this game as second brings the lowest amount donated, as well as a
significant reduction in the probability of donating.
Similar conclusions can be made when considering a neighbour as receivers: Table 3 shows
how playing the dictator on relatives as first significantly reduced the amount donated to
a neighbour, both according to the OLS (-29.09 dollars) and the Tobit; at the same time,
different positions of this game does not significantly change the amount donated (except for
playing this as third compared to first, significantly positive in the Tobit regression); how-
ever, second and third positions significantly increase the likelihood of a positive donation
by nine percentage points (compared to playing it first).
To conclude, Tables 4 and 5 highlight the differences of the games towards a relative and the
government compared to the first two discussed: in both cases, the ordering does not bring
significant effects, and the same is true for having a relative receiver in the first game.
Other Regressors
Tables 6 and 7 contain the effects of the other regressors on the dependent variables, on
which the literature on dictator games is widely focusing on.
Considering gender, the different regressions show no differences in the probability of donat-
ing; however, there is a significant reduction in the amount corresponded to the receiver in
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case of female respondents; this is shown in the OLS, but only for anonymous, government
and neighbor games (not significant effects of gender in the treatment about relatives). This
result is confirmed by Tobit regression only for the dictator towards the government.
Compared to single respondents, who are married or in a domestic relationship donated more
to anonymous and neighbor, and in the latter case, the likelihood of donating increases as
well.
A variable that has a strong significant effect across different games and regressions was
the extent to which the respondents agreed to the statement: ”The current government is
credible.”
Compared to who selected the option ”Strongly Disagree,” agreeing or strongly agreeing to
increase the amount OLS, Tobit, and quantile regressions) and the probability of donating
not only towards the government but to anonymous and a neighbour as well. At the opposite,
the answers on the statement ”COVID-19 could harm my family” does not bring significant
effects on the outcome variables, except for a decrease in the probability of donating to a
neighbour if the answer was ”Strongly Agree.”
Living in different states brings some significant effects: donations from Washington are sig-
nificantly higher if towards a neighbour (OLS, Tobit, quantile .5 and .75) and government
(Tobit), while for small amounts being from New York State has a significant and negative
effect. For the probability of donating, being from Washington significantly enhances the
likelihood in all except neighbour dictator games.
Age also has an impact: compared to the category 18-24, 35 to 44 and 45 to 54 bring a
reduction in the amount donated towards anonymous and the government (OLS and Tobit,
for the latter also the quantile .5), while for the neighbour game only the first of these two
categories has an impact. ”45-54” category also reduces the likelihood of donating towards
the government and its public services.
Among the employment and financial-related variables, higher unemployment rates bring
a (small, compared to the effects discussed for the Covid-19 related regressors) significant
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reduction in donations towards neighbours (OLS, Tobit, and .75 quantile).
A broad effect of self-reported anxiety is visible across the inferential results: strongly agree-
ing on ”Overall, in the last week I felt anxious” significantly increases amounts donated
to anonymous, and also the lower categories have a positive effect on other dictator games
(neighbour and government). Second and third quartile regressions also show significant
increases in donations, as well as there is a positive effect on the probability of donating to
anonymous, relatives, and government.
Overall, regressors show significant effects on donations towards a relative very rarely (none
of them in OLS and Tobit, considering the variables mentioned in this sub-section).
4 Discussion
The results of this paper show how COVID-19 and related lock-down have a broad, signif-
icant effect on generous behaviours; self-reported concern for the pandemic has a positive
impact on amount and likelihood of donations, and across the eight weeks of lock-down in-
vestigated there is an even more substantial and increasingly positive effect.
This finding shows the dynamic variation of generous behaviours, and it is particularly inter-
esting considering the simultaneous decrease in employment and financial resources recorded
in the three states analysed.
The effects of the main regressors are not homogeneous across the various dictator games:
concern for COVID-19 is not significant for donations towards anonymous but instead has
an effect on the amount directed to relatives and the government, as well as increases the
probability of donating to a neighbour and the government. Considering the weeks, the re-
sults are more similar across games, and in some cases, monotonic increases are observable.
Findings of the game towards a relative are especially important since regressions show that
almost all the other independent variables, in this case, are not significant; donations towards
relatives probably depend on much deeper social dynamics, built across years of relation-
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ship, and these aspects are probably not captured by the regressors considered. Regressors
on COVID-19 show positive effects on donations, however, with differences to the other
games.
For instance, the percentage change in deaths is not a significant regressor in general, with
one interesting exception: for high donations towards relatives, it has a positive effect on
the amount donated. High donations could indicate a positive bond with relatives, and
intuitively a negative context in terms of deaths could trigger empathy sentiments and the
need to protect who is part of the family.
Overall, the three variables used to capture the effects of pandemic highlight the positive role
it has on generosity, even if further research would be needed to understand the mechanism
behind this effect. While the self-reported level of concern could relate to the sentiment of
empathy described in de Waal (2008), it is more complex to infer how a prolonged lock-down
could gradually enhance donations. In a sense, policies adopted during the pandemic are a
different form of social distancing as intended in the dictator game literature so far (Hoff-
man et al. (1996), Bohnet and Frey (1999); in this research, it appears that the dispositional
knowledge on altruism and social preferences do not decrease with the increasing length (and
strength, in case of more severe lock-down rules applied over time) of social distance. This
result is not in line with Hoffman et al.
Considering the relative position of games, and the role of donating towards a relative before
other categories, results show significant results. Not playing the game towards an anony-
mous receiver as first reduces the amount and probability of donating, and if a neighbour is
considered after a relative, there is a negative effect on the average donation. This finding
demonstrates how individuals could end up creating reference points depending on how tasks
are framed, which would challenge hypotheses of perfectly rational and consistent social pref-
erences.
The relation between anxiety and generosity is not widely investigated in the literature;
however, this paper shows a strong positive role of this regressor across the four dictator
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games. At the same time, findings on gender show higher altruism from men (but not in the
case of a relative receiver), which is not in line with Heinz (2011) and Selten and Ockenfels
(1996). A possible explanation could be provided by Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), which
show how men are more generous when this has cheap consequences. With respect to age, it
is possible that the two categories “34-44” and “45-54” are consistently donating less than
the others because they have family members (children) financially relying on them.
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